Swine Flu Scare, 1976

(From DISCovering U.S. History, available in Student Resource Center and cross-searched via the Gale PowerSearch platform)

Fears of a Major Pandemic

When swine flu was first identified as the agent responsible for a small outbreak of respiratory disease among recruits at Fort Dix, New Jersey, in February 1976, there was ample cause for concern. Hsw l N l, the swine flu virus, was the cause of the pandemic of 1918, which killed 20 million people worldwide and 500,000 in the U.S. Since the late 1920s, the strain was only found in pigs; no human being under fifty could have built up antibodies to it. This meant what might (or might not) be a virulent human flu virus had acquired a new outer coat of antigenic proteins that might (or might not) make it very contagious to humans. The Federal Government's Center for Disease Control recommended a major effort to produce a vaccine against the new strain.

President Ford's Decision

In March, President Gerald Ford announced an unprecedented nationwide campaign to inoculate every American against swine flu. Congress appropriated $135 million to finance the effort, and after a variety of delays and concerns about proper dosages, it got underway on 1 October.

Guillain-Barré Syndrome

In the first ten days of the program, more than 1 million people were vaccinated. Then, first in Pittsburgh and later elsewhere, came reports of deaths following vaccinations. The final blow came in December. A rare paralytic disease called Guillain-Barré syndrome was reported in a few people who had been vaccinated. It was never clear whether the syndrome was related to the swine flu vaccine, but it was clear the program had to be suspended. The mass-immunization program ended on December 16 and was not resumed. The epidemic never occurred.

"The Swine Flu Fiasco"

In February 1977, the new Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Joseph Califano, commissioned a review of what had become known as "the swine flu fiasco." It was clear a mass epidemic was cause for concern. But hindsight suggested a better option was not considered enough: stockpiling a vaccine and waiting for evidence of a significant spread of the virus before proceeding to mass immunization. Not enough attention was paid to the realities of news coverage including preparing the public for such foreseeable incidents as the Pittsburgh deaths or reacting to the appearance of a side effect such as the Guillain-Barré syndrome. The authors of the review, Richard E. Neustadt of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, and Harvey V. Fineberg, M.D., of the Harvard School of Public Health, examined the administrative and technical difficulties that arise whenever science and public policy come together and concluded, "[in 1976] in the absence of manifest danger, all-out action was a mistake."